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Abstract 
International migration is an expensive form of investment, that only households relatively better off can 
afford. However poorer households have the higher incentive to migrate. Migration decision is conditional 
on the entry cost, expected returns and risks of migration. This paper, using data from Mexican rural and 
urban areas, examines the relation between household and community networks and costs and risks of 
migration focusing on the optimal investment in migration. To investigate an household optimal number of 
migrants this paper introduces a Three Step procedure to solve simultaneously for the endogeneity of 
network size and possible selection of migrants. The analysis confirms the inverted U-shaped relation 
between wealth and migration, stressing the importance of networks particularly in facilitating the 
migration of social strata belonging to the left tail of the income distribution. Moreover, in presence of sunk 
costs and/or high initial investment, household and community networks accomplish different functions. 
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Introduction  
This paper aims to fill a gap in the literature on the determinants of migration: the optimal number 
of migrants in household migration strategy. While at a first glance it could appear of marginal importance, 
this is a key issue in many local and international migration flows. 
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To estimate the optimal number of migrants in household strategic behavior requires to reconsider 
costs and risks of migration, and therefore their relation to networks. Cost and risk of migration are not 
merely a barrier to entrance, but they differentiate among household and communities determining both 
the probability of, and the optimal investment in migration. Starting from the idea that wage gaps2 are the 
fundamental elements driving labor migration in a household income maximization decision, this study 
analyses the link between budget constraints, costs and risks of migration and migrant networks. 
Households are decision makers endowed with production capabilities (labor, land and financial 
assets) that can be allocated to improve household wealth in a world where international mobility of labor 
is feasible. To identify households as decision makers optimizing their wellbeing implies to determine both 
the probability of migration, and the optimal number of migrants (i.e. the optimal investment). Despite the 
little attention devoted by economic literature to the optimal number of migrants, the dimension of the 
phenomenon is central to improve our understanding of migration flows. For instance in our sample, the 
24.70 percent of the 2024 Mexican households involved in migration has more than one member abroad. If 
we were computing only migration propensities and use them to forecast Mexican migration to the US, we 
would underestimate the flow by 756 units (37.0 per cent). 
Since the seminal work of Roy (1951), many economists have investigated the causes of labor 
mobility. Several prominent scholars have concentrated their analysis on the relation between migration 
expected returns, costs, risks, networks and social capital. Borjas (1994, 1995a, 1995b), reviewing the 
literature on immigration to the US, focused on the quality of migrants, their wage convergence path, their 
contribution to the welfare state, and second-generation migrants. Ghatak et al. (1996, pag:1), presenting 
“a critical survey of theories of migration, their welfare and policy implication and their empirical 
relevance”, show that international labor migration is not the immediate response to wage differentials. 
Massey et al. (1993) provide the most complete review of migration theories, carefully labeling them in 
eight different groups, discussing their empirical evidence, pros and cons, and promoting a process of 
convergence. More recently, Hatton and Williamson (2003), summarizing the literature, look specifically at 
empirical studies on the economic and demographic fundamentals driving world migration, whereas de 
Haan (2006) analyses the literature on migration and its links with development studies. Lastly, Radu (2008) 
reviews migration literature, looking specifically at the effect of social interactions on migration and how 
they have been treated in theoretical and empirical research. 
The relation between wealth and migration is the starting point for economists in studying the 
determinants of migration flows. For neoclassical theory3, migration is the result of the aggregation of 
rational choices made by single potential migrants trying to maximize their income in response to wage 
gaps across countries. The rationality of their choices and the possibility of not undertaking migration lie at 
the basis of voluntary labor migration (Sjaastad, 1962). However, if this were the whole truth, we should 
observe much larger migration flows than those observed in reality. For example, Clemens et al. (2008) 
showed that the yearly net return to migration from Mexico to the U.S. in 1994 was of the order of 15,000 
US$, while the cost of a coyote4 was 619 US$ (Orrenius, 1999).5 Hanson (2006) estimates that, in 2000, a 
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23-27-year-old Mexican migrant with 5-8 years of schooling would have covered the cost of crossing the 
border in 313 hours of work in the U.S.  
A partial explanation of these discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical 
observations is due to the presence of borrowing constraints. Costs, thus budget constraints are in fact one 
of the main elements limiting migration. Nonetheless, budget constraints and imperfect financial markets 
can only explain why we observe relatively low levels of migration even in the presence of large wage gaps 
(Hatton and Williamson, 1992), but they cannot explain other empirical findings, such as the high ethnic 
concentration of migrants in some specific areas (friends and relatives effect). 
New Economy of Labor Migration (NELM),6 finding in the imperfection of insurance and credit 
markets the main causes of migration, provides a partial explanation to these problems. Identifying the 
household as the decisional unit, NELM allows potential migrants to exploit a larger set of optimization 
strategies; in particular, migration is the result of a process of income risk minimization. Households, 
composed of a certain number of members, permit strategic allocation of workers in different sectors of 
the economy or in different countries. If risk minimization is the only objective function, we should observe 
widespread migration, with migrants from the same household working in different countries or economic 
sectors, whereas migrants usually tend to concentrate in specific groups and economic sectors. 
Although NELM explicitly identifies in household internal links one of the key aspects in migration 
decisions, households do act independently of each other, and equilibrating mechanisms are determined 
by aggregate behaviors.7 This is not likely to be the case in the real world, where interactions outside the 
households have been shown to be crucial in many economic decisions,8 specifically on the decision to 
migrate. 
Network theory (Fawcett, 1989; Massey and Espinosa, 1997) based on social interactions explains 
the high ethnic concentration of migrants and the presence of migrant flows with preferential receiving 
counties. Each migrant, creating new links in the receiving country and retaining9 some in the sending 
country, modifies the social environment in both, allowing the accumulation of migration-specific 
knowledge (migration social capital) able to reduce the costs and risks of migration and generating a self-
perpetuating mechanism. In particular, networks affect the relation between migration and wealth, 
mitigating the effect of budget constraints not only by reducing costs and risks, but also acting as 
substitutes for financial and insurance markets (Yang, 2008). 
The endogenous process identified by network theory is not limited to potential migrants, since 
migration alters the whole sending country’s socio-economic environment. The accumulation of migration-
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specific social capital, remittances, changes in the distribution of wealth10 and land, all concur in generating 
a new set-up which has the potential to produce favorable new conditions for migration. Cumulative 
causation, as developed by Massey and followers, goes in this direction, providing a general framework for 
tracing potential migration paths. 
Household and community networks channel international mobility of labor, however they are 
determinant only if we consider them in conjunction with cost and risks of migration. This complex 
endogenous relation is one of the most challenging empirical issues associated with  migration studies. The 
other main problem is the sample selection. At priori we cannot exclude that there are some unobserved 
characteristics driving the propensity of certain household to migrate.  
Since the aim of this paper is to analyze both the propensity and the optimal number of migrants in 
a single framework, it is necessary to develop an empirical approach able to disentangle simultaneously 
sample selection and endogeneity of network size. Usually, to tackle selection, the Heckman correction 
method is applied. Since the HTS procedure is not reliable in the presence of endogenous phenomena, 
following Mroz (1987) and Piacentini (2008), this paper introduces a three-steps procedure new for 
international migration analysis. This approach allows to identify the effect of selection (Probit and IV-
Probit) and to examine the number of migrants a household sends abroad (IMR and IV-TSLS).  
Using the Mexican Migration project data (MMP), the econometric results presented in this paper 
show that migration and wealth are non-linearly related (inverted U-shape) and that household and 
community level networks are complements in the migration decision, but substitutes in the optimal 
number of migrants. As pointed out networks have a role in migration decision conditional on the presence 
of costs and risks of migration. The differentiated structure of costs and risks implies that different 
networks accomplish different functions. This result, new in empirical literature, requires to re-evaluate the 
relation between networks and migration costs and risks.  
 
Section 1 Basic Model 
 
Consider a dual economy along the lines of McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) with           
households of size           .
11 Households are endowed with an illiquid asset    which is the basis of 
the family business. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that income is equally shared among 
household members, that each household member lives for two periods      , and that each member 
provides one unit of work to the family business. The marginal product of family business is also linearly 
increasing in the initial endowment and marginally decreasing in the number of workers, so that one simple 
possible representation is: 
        
   
 
 
         ( ) 
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 Docquier and Rapoport (2003) develop a model to analyze the link between migration, remittances and inequality. 
The main pro of their model is to take into account the effect of migration in local labor markets, making migration an 
endogenous process even in the absence of networks able to reduce the cost of migration. 
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A household member can migrate at a cost   , which is assumed to be fixed and exogenous. If a 
household member migrates he or she will receive a salary    [       ], where   stands for foreign 
country. We assume that risk12 is fixed and exogenous, and that     is equal for each household member 
and for each potential migrant across the society.13 
In order to take into account the incompleteness of insurance and financial markets we assume that 
borrowing is not allowed,14 so that migration must be financed through savings. This implies that migration 
is impossible in the first period, and that the decision to migrate is the effect of household income 
maximization in the second period, when the household can use savings to finance migration. The 
household cannot save all its first period income, but it needs to consume at least   (Subsistence need) for 
each member at that time. 
We also assume that       and that    
   
 
  . The first assumption implies that migration is 
appealing, and the second that the share of wealth each household member has is large enough to ensure 
survival. 
In this simplified framework, a household15 chooses the share of members who migrate  , to 
maximize the second-period income. Because income maximization does not take into account risk and 
uncertainty aversion,16 in order to implement them this model assumes Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
(CARA) utility functions.   is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and expected salaries are 
distributed as a normal.17 Making use of CARA properties, and assuming no discounting, the household 
second-period maximization is: 
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To simplify notation, we suppress subscript  . Solving first-order conditions,  , the optimal rate of 
outmigration is: 
   
         
 (     )
 
  
  (     )
   ( ) 
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 Risk is here intended as the risk of failure in migration and as uncertainty about future income, due to lack of 
information of the receiving country’s labor market. 
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 This to simplify the analysis; in principle it may be extended by introducing various expected incomes and costs 
based on household social strata. This would imply the introduction of different networks which might have different 
properties, complicating the theoretical analysis and making an empirical investigation difficult or even unfeasible. 
14
 Thus the focus is on migration between countries with different levels of development (i.e., South-North migration). 
15
 How the decision is taken inside the household is not examined here. 
16
 This is the first difference with respect to McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), who do not take into account 
risk/uncertainty. 
17
 Salaries are usually distributed as a log-normal distribution, however this assumption is technically necessary, and it 
does not determines our results being the investigation of risk beyond the scope of this paper. 
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   is increasing in expected salary  , and decreasing in its variance         and in migration costs 
 .   is equal to 0, unless the vinculum binds. If it binds, as in McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), the 
constrained migration rate is: 
 ̃  
 
 
(  
  
 
  )   ( ) 
We can compute the highest level of fixed assets at which a household has no possibility of 
migrating,   
  
 
  . Define    the level of illiquid assets, above which a household is no longer trapped 
by subsistence needs: 
    ̃ ⇒    
     (   )        (     )    (     )
(            )
 ( ) 
If either     or household is risk neutral, the analysis comes back to McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2007). We can also identify the minimal value of   at which households will not choose migration as the 
optimal behavioral strategy. This value is equal to that computed by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007): 
     (   )   ( ) 
The migration rate changes depending on the initial endowment: 
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Thus, the migration rate path in relation to wealth levels is: 
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This system can be graphically represented as in McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) though a 
“triangular” representation of the relation between the share of migration and the initial endowment of 
immobile capital. Introducing the risk/uncertainty of migration generalizes the model, so that McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2007) is a specific case of this model. 
As shown in Picture 1, the household migration rate is a triangular function of immobile assets, 
migration is 0 under subsistence needs when the initial endowment of assets is below  . First it increases 
with wealth up to   , and then it decreases until it returns to 0 when the initial endowment is above  . 
 
 
 
𝐴 𝐴  𝐴 
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Section 2 Data 
 
In order to investigate the optimal investment in migration, thus the optimal number of members 
sent in migration, the ideal dataset should include individual and community information on household 
resources endowment (labor, land and financial assets), household histories of migration, and community 
migration capital. I focused on the MMP118 database, a collaborative research project based at Princeton 
University and the University of Guadalajara18organizing information on 118 communities surveyed in the 
period 1987-2007. In my opinion and to the best of my knowledge, this is the database closest to the ideal 
one. 
There are several important pros in using Mexican data. First of all Mexico and US share the longest 
border between a developing and a developed country. Secondly Mexico represents a promising setup to 
test the quality of the empirical procedure proposed because migrants networks are diffused and stratified 
spatially and in time. Additionally the availability of a large number of studies focusing on the determinants 
of Mexican migration to the US allows to compare result with a well-established background. 
The dataset includes information on 19,726 Mexican households. It is a household-level database 
containing information on household composition, economic and migratory activities of household 
members, land ownership and usage, home/real estate ownership and amenities, vehicle and livestock 
ownership and financing, and business ownership and operations. 
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Although the MMP probably represents the most comprehensive database on Mexican migration, 
it includes no reliable information on household income, so that an alternative measure had to be found. 
The MMP includes information on household access to infrastructures, such as access to electricity and 
running water, dirt or tile floors, and household ownership of some durable assets such as cars, radios and 
television sets, allowing the application of PCA to derive a household wealth indicator. Filmer and Pritchett 
(2001) used PCA to derive household wealth in India and several other countries, and showed that an asset-
derived index is as accurate as information on expenditures in predicting school enrollment of children. 
McKenzie (2005) showed how information from the MMP can be used in conjunction with national income 
and expenditure surveys (ENIGH) to predict non-durable consumption (NDC) and derive a reliable 
inequality index for Mexico. Since the investigation of inequality is beyond the scope of this paper, I focus 
on Principal Components.19 
 
2.1 Household Composition 
In the present analysis a household is defined as migrant when one or more of its members have 
migrated to the U.S. in the three years prior to the survey. According to this definition, in the sample there 
are 2,024 migrant households (15.81 percent). Household heads with previous migration experience are 
not dropped from the sample,20 expecting previous migration experiences to play a key role in developing a 
network. 
Human Capital Assets identify a series of structural household elements which are likely to affect 
migration, as shown among others by Winters et al. (2001). 
The size of migrant households (that is, the number of household members) is larger than the size 
of non-migrant households by around 0.8, and the difference is statistically significant (0.01 confidence 
level) when a t-test is performed.21 The average age of migrant household heads is below that of non-
migrant household heads.22 As well established in literature, it is more likely that subjects migrate for the 
first time when they are relatively young, to maximize expected returns.  
In line with previous findings, the education level of non-migrant households is higher than that of 
migrants.  
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 Using assets as instruments for household wealth overcomes two main problems typical of income or expenditure 
data, since these are more subject to measurement errors. Secondly, consumption expenditures and income need to 
be normalized, to take into account the number of members in the family, whereas the utility of assets is usually the 
same for all household members, independently of their number. 
20
 McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) only study first time migrant households. 
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 Winter et al. (2001) report a difference of 3 members in favor of migrant households, but their measure only refers 
to the number of adults. 
22
 Only Winters et al. (2001) find migrant household heads to be older than non-migrants. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-Test
Sample Size 2024 - 10781 - 12805 -
Number of recent US Trips 1,374 0,787 0,000 0,000 0,217 0,591 *
Human Capital Assets
N° of Members 5,399 2,527 4,629 2,285 4,751 2,342 *
N° of Workers 2,216 1,516 1,758 1,200 1,830 1,266 *
Percentage of Males 0,493 0,190 0,452 0,212 0,458 0,209 *
Household age 43,482 13,881 48,388 15,587 47,612 15,434 *
Eucation Level 5,073 3,438 5,669 4,230 5,575 4,121 *
Cross effect Wealth and Education
educ*wealth 26,350 19,599 30,013 25,016 29,434 24,276 *
Physical Assets PCA
Wealth 5,028 0,848 4,968 1,039 4,978 1,011 *
Household Network
Historic Migration Experience 4,200 6,504 0,723 2,259 1,273 3,548 *
Current Network 16,417 21,445 7,702 14,028 9,080 15,762 *
U.S. resident 1,063 1,646 0,463 1,092 0,557 1,217 *
Community Network
Migration Prevalence 0,268 0,139 0,189 0,148 0,201 0,149 *
Migration Prevalence*Wealth 1,346 0,752 0,928 0,747 0,994 0,763 *
Physical Costs
Average Distance from the U.S. 1901,343 198,474 1889,724 279,267 1891,560 268,148
Border (dummy) 0,041 0,197 0,125 0,331 0,112 0,315
Economic Indicators
Mexican Unemployment Level 0,034 0,008 0,034 0,008 0,034 0,008
US Unemployment Level 0,057 0,008 0,055 0,008 0,056 0,008
Exchange Rate 5,339 3,092 6,573 3,233 6,378 3,242
Migrants Non-Migrants Total
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Source: authors from MMP118, NATLHIST, NATLYEAR, Google Maps Tools for distances 
 
2.2 Household Capital Assets 
Since income information is not reliable, it is necessary to identify an alternative way of measuring 
household wealth. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and McKenzie (2005), a reliable index of 
household wealth is obtained by using PCA on a set of information on household facilities and asset 
indicators such as land holdings, house building materials and amenities. The basic idea behind PCA is to 
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describe a multivariate dataset in the most “simple” way possible through a set of derived uncorrelated 
variables, each of which is a linear combination of the variables in the original dataset. 
PCA makes one stringent assumption: linearity, identifying the combination of original basis which 
best represent the dataset. The First Principal Component is the linear combination of all the variables 
which capture the largest variability and thus the largest amount of information.23 
Assuming that what mainly determines variations in housing construction materials, amenities, 
vehicle ownership and business holdings is wealth,24 the first factor (Principal Component) identifies the 
wealth level of a household. MMP118 includes 27 asset indicators grouped in four main categories: farming 
and breeding, property holding, household amenities, and business holdings. Table 2 lists the scoring 
factors of each group and all components.25 
Factors derived using information about housing and amenity ownership are highly correlated with 
the Total Index 25 (TI25). TI25 is similar to the wealth index derived by McKenzie (2005) and used in 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007). Only three elements differ. TI25 includes the number of hectares owned 
and the number of businesses held by the household not taken into consideration in McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007), whereas information about education is excluded from the PCA index. The introduction of 
the first two elements aims at increasing the number of variables which may, in principle, reflect the long-
run wealth level of the household. Although educational attainment is highly correlated with the wellbeing 
of a household, the information is not used to derive TI25, since it is a regressor for migration analysis. 
The farming factor has a low and negative correlation with TI25. One explanation is that, on 
average, rural households are poorer. The very low coefficient may be explained by the large amount of 0’s 
in farming and breeding activities: only around 2000 households own land and even fewer own animals. 
Similarly, the low correlation coefficient between the Business factor and TI25 may be explained by the 
large amount of 0’s in the sample. 
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 See Filmer and Pritchett (2001) for exhaustive information. 
24
 It is implicitly assumed that everyone prefers higher (in quality or numbers) asset ownership than lower ones. 
Differences are not the effect of tastes but of different economic opportunities. 
25
 For what concern housing, business and farming activities the information refer to prior the last migration was 
undertaken if the household is defined as migrant. This was not possible for amenities. 
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Farming PCA Housing PCA Amenities 
PCA
Business 
PCA
Total Index 
25
Farming and Breeding
Land Ownership 0.8533 -0.0998
N° of hectares per household 0.2968 0.0138
Machinery 0.7934
Fertilizers 0.8627
Insecticides 0.8399
Cows 0.322
Pigs 0.1129
Horses 0.3927
Burros 0.3312
Oxen 0.1827
Chicken 0.3025
Housing 
N° of Property Holding 0.1825 0.2088
Construction1: adobe and tile roof -0.4428 -0.437
Construction2: brick and tile roof -0.5786 -0.3448
Construction3: brick and cement roof 0.7952 0.6005
Construction4: wood -0.1013 -0.0902
Floor1: dirt -0.4046 -0.5386
Floor2: cement -0.6122 -0.3832
Floor3: finished 0.8302 0.6752
N° of rooms 0.5546
N° of rooms/member 0.3445
Amenities and vehicles
Running water 0.4162 0.3807
Electricity 0.4084 0.3493
Sewer 0.5326 0.5473
Stove 0.5699 0.5224
Refrigerator 0.7419 0.7142
Washing machine 0.6849 0.6397
Sewing machine 0.461 0.4194
Radio 0.39 0.3197
TV 0.5749 0.4948
Stereo 0.6241 0.5879
Phone 0.5877 0.5938
Car 0.422 0.4116
Van 0.3239 0.2925
Bus 0.069
Tractor 0.0744
Taxi 0.0449
Motorcycle 0.0493
Other vehicle 0.0055
Business Holdings
N° of business holdings 0.9956 0.1931
Business type: store 0.4652
Business type: street vendor 0.395
Business type: restaurant/bar 0.2258
Business type: workshop 0.3541
Business type: factory 0.1068
Business type: middleman 0.1971
Business type: personal service 0.1636
Business type: professional service 0.1112
Business type: other service 0.0971
Business type: agriculture 0.2814
Business type: cattle raising 0.242
Business type: other 0.3769
Eigenvalues associated with first component 3.40048 2.742 3.69581 1.91871 5.01601
Share of variance associated with first component 0.3091 0.3047 0.2053 0.1476 0.2006
Number of variables used 11 9 18 13 25
Correlation with TI25 -0.0492 0.7881 0.935 0.1931
Table 2: PCA; Scoring Factors
 
Table 2. Author from database 
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2.3 Network Variables 
Household network is identified by three main variables: the number of historic migration 
experiences, current network, and household relationships with U.S. residents.  
The historic migration experience is defined as the sum of the number of migration experiences of 
household heads and/or their spouses, sons and daughters prior to the last 3 years.  
Current network is the number of friends and relatives, not belonging to the household but to the 
extended family, who were abroad in the year of the survey.  
U.S. resident is the number of relatives actually residing in the U.S.. Both variables are likely to 
affect migration decisions. Each household member can, in fact, receive financial support, assistance and 
information from the network. Specifically, three aspects of current household migration networks may 
have a great influence on migration decisions: financial support, housing, and information. 
Financial support may be fundamental in overcoming budget constraints, particularly when 
crossing the border is expensive. Those who have already migrated can finance migration of co-villagers 
and relatives for various reasons: altruism, inequality aversion, social norms, loan repayments, household 
income maximization strategies, household income risk minimization, or speculation. Independently of the 
reason, financial support allows potential migrants to overcome budget constraints. 
Housing has been shown to represent the main cost, at least in the first phase of residence in the 
receiving country. The larger the number of connections (or, even better, some residents), the greater the 
reduction of this cost. Housing support is usually “rent-free”. 
Last but not least, information: there are two main sources of risk, border crossing and 
unemployment. To be in contact with someone who has recently migrated or who is currently residing in 
the U.S. can greatly improve the information available to potential migrants and their households. 
Specifically, recent migrants can provide information on how to cross borders, can introduce potential 
migrants to coyote, or help newcomers with bureaucracy. Contacts in the receiving country can provide 
information on potentially available jobs.26 
Community-level networks are sources of information and a series of services which could reduce 
both the psychological and the physical cost and risks of migration, for example providing ethnic goods 
through formal or informal markets, organizing money transfers and transportation services, spreading 
knowledge on the receiving country, and even running development programs in sending communities. 
However, identification of community-level network effects on migration is not straightforward. 
The main difficulty is finding an appropriate measure able to capture all these functions. Following 
Durand et al. (2001), I used migration prevalence ratios to incorporate the community-level migration 
network: migration prevalence does not describe the migration flow per se, but rather, a phase in its 
development. It is a useful measure which can capture the level of development of migration flows in a 
                                                          
26
 In Texas and California resident migrants often act as recruiters in seasonal farming work. This may explain the high 
ethnic concentration of Mexicans in certain economic sectors. Moreover, some migrants resident in the U.S. become 
entrepreneurs, hiring compatriots as employees. 
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community. Migration prevalence ratios are calculated with information on the date of birth of household 
members and the year of their first trip to the U.S..27 
Nevertheless, migration prevalence has some important disadvantages. First, as already highlighted 
by Durand et al. (2001), “it tends to dehistoricize migration”. This means that specific local or global events 
affecting migration rates (e.g., the 1925 railway construction, the 1940s Bracero Program, the 1980s 
economic crisis, 9/11) may occur at any moment in the history of migration of different communities, thus 
implying different effects. The use of IV, as in McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), not only solves endogeneity 
but also avoids the dehistoricization of migration. 
Migration prevalence may be biased upwards or downwards, depending on internal and permanent 
migration dynamics. It may be overestimated if internal and international migrations are substitutes, or if 
migration becomes permanent (migrant households disappear from surveys). 
Migration prevalence is a very powerful tool when applied to migration contexts presenting a 
prevalent destination country, such as the U.S. for Mexico. At the same time, migration prevalence 
captures some innate propensities of certain communities to migrate. This propensity cannot be captured 
with variables such as the stock of compatriots in the receiving country, so that migration prevalence 
improves understanding of the migration flow, allowing better generalization network effects derived from 
individual data.  
 
2.4 Physical Costs and Economic Indicators 
Distance28 is likely to be an approximate measure of the cost of migration. In cross-country 
migration flow analysis, distance is always used as a rough measure of physical cost of migration and of 
cultural distance. In unidirectional analysis, distance should still have a negative significant influence on the 
decision to migrate, if the sending country is large enough and if the cost of moving between countries is 
high enough to become a barrier. 
 Economic Indicators are likely to affect household migration strategies. Average levels are 
computed as the means in the last three years before the survey was undertaken. Unemployment levels are 
likely to be a partial measure of risk. To avoid possible fluctuations due to the business cycle I used the 
difference in unemployment levels between U.S. and Mexico and the exchange rate to measure the 
monetary advantages of migration. It affects not only the expected return of migration, but the family 
income risk minimization strategy. Migrating when exchange rates are high increases household wellbeing 
in Mexico. Remittances have higher value, since they are in U.S. dollars. Besides, having remittances in U.S. 
dollars ensures households against hyperinflation and monetary devaluation. 
 
2.5 U.S. Immigration Policy 
 One of the aims of this research is to improve the methodological approach in the study of the 
determinants of migration, to provide policy-makers with better forecasting instruments. Of particular 
                                                          
27
 For a complete explanation on how to compute migration prevalence ratios, see Massey et al. (1994). 
28
 Distance is measured as the average distance of the Mexico state capital of the community in question and the U.S. 
state capitals of California and Texas. 
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relevance from the policy maker point of view is the effect of legislation on potential migrant decisions. In 
this analysis the implementation of U.S. immigration legislation is made using the index proposed by Ortega 
and Peri (2009).29 Authors database contains information on the immigration legislation of 15 OECD 
countries over the period 1980-2005. Each change in legislation is associated with a (+1) or a (-1), whenever 
a reform increases or decreases the tightness of immigration laws. Since Mexican emigration is mainly 
unidirectional to the U.S., this work focuses on U.S. legislation over the period 1987-2005 (see Table 3). 
 The database provides three variables on the tightness of entry, stay and refugee regulations. The 
focus here is not on refugees, so the refugees variable is not taken into consideration; moreover, since it is 
not within the scope of this paper to examine U.S. immigration policy in detail, I produced a single index, 
which is the yearly mean of entry and stay. Using only one index for the tightness of U.S. immigration policy 
also saves degrees of freedom in “temporal” analysis. The resulting variable (avglaw) is expected to have a 
significant negative influence on migration. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
US Immigration Policy (Peri)
Entry -3,2488 1,6587 -3,5589 1,2205 -3,5099 1,3045
Stay -1,1525 0,6517 -1,1574 0,7139 -1,1567 0,7044
Table 3: US immigration Policy
Migrans Non Migrants Total
 
Table 3: Authors from Ortega and Peri (2009) 
 
Section 3 Empirical Specifications 
 
In order to analyze the optimal investment in migration conditional on the probability to be 
involved in migration, it is necessary to control simultaneously for both migrant selection and endogeneity 
of network size. This paper introduces a procedure based on the three-step procedure proposed by Mroz 
(1987): the first step solves the self-selection problem by examining the dichotomous choice of migration; 
the second step tackles potential endogeneity in network size by using instrumental variables; the third 
step identifies the network effect by including both sample selection and instrumental variable approach in 
a structural equation for the number of migrants. 
To show the efficiency of this approach, estimations for the HTS procedure and the IV approach are 
provided. The HTS procedure was used, among others, by Winters et al. (2001), and the IV-Probit approach 
was successfully applied by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007).  
 
                                                          
29
 For more details see the Giovanni Peri website http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/ and Ortega and Peri 
(2009). 
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3.1 Solving Sample Selection, HTSp 
The reduced form of the econometric model for the decision to migrate (d) can be formulated as 
follow: 
             ( ) 
    if     , 0 otherwise. The level of migration equation is: 
           (  ), 
observed if    , with (     )  (          ) and  {              }  
The estimation is made with the HTS procedure: the first stage is estimated by maximum likelihood 
probit, and the second stage by a truncated least squares regression. This procedure computes unbiased 
estimators in the second stage (by including the IMR), but it cannot solve the endogeneity problem.  
As pointed by Winter et al. (2001), if there were no entry costs, the household income 
maximization decision would be the same as the decision of the level of migration. However since 
migration is costly, the decisions are different. The optimal number of migrants is in fact independent of 
the fixed cost, while undertaking migration a household requires positive returns, including the fixed cost of 
that migration. While Winter et al. (2001) had no measure for costs, so that the selection equation lacked 
an identification variable, two rough measures for the migration cost are available here: distance and 
border. 
Table 3 reports estimation results. Robust standard errors were obtained by the bootstrapping 
method. Appendix report HTSP with non-robust, robust and cluster robust standard errors.30 Although 
estimations cannot be directly compared with those by Winters et al (2001), the two analyses produced 
similar results, highlighting the importance of network and wealth variables. 
The main variables of interest, those concerning wealth and networks, are all significant and have 
the expected direction. Wealth has a positive effect on migration decisions, whereas the negative sign of 
squared wealth suggests that migration propensity decreases after a certain threshold is reached. Thus, as 
hypothesized, there is an inverted U-shape relation between wealth and migration. While wealth affects 
the migration propensity, it has a slightly significant positive effect on the optimal number of migrants. This 
is in line with the initial investment problem. 
As expected, migration prevalence has a statistically significant and positive effect on migration. 
Similarly, household migration experience, current network, and U.S. resident all positively affect migration. 
While migration prevalence and U.S. resident affect only the probability of migration, past migration 
experience and current network also positively affect the number of migrants. The positive and significant 
effect of this group of variables confirms the positive influence of migrant networks, on both the decision 
to migrate and the number of migrants sent abroad. Nonetheless, the positive significance of all the 
estimated coefficients highlights that community and household-level networks are both important in the 
migration decision. Thus, they are, at least partly, complements. In addition, community-level networks 
                                                          
30
 Robust standard errors were applied. Differences in SE are low (below 10-15%) between robust and non-robust 
estimates for all significant variables. Cluster robust SE show greater differences, particularly as regards migration 
prevalence. Clustering was made at community level and this seems to be imprecise: the sample probably contained 
heteroskedasticity at community, state and national level. 
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affecting only the probability of migration and not its optimal level, convey forms of information and 
support that are different from household ones. 
In contrast with the findings of Winters et al. (2001), there is no evidence of education effect on 
either the propensity to migrate31 or the number of migrants. The weak negative link (0.05 significance 
level) between the cross-effect of education and wealth and the number of migrants corroborate the idea 
that education should be considered in the wealth indicator as a measure of household asset levels. 
In line with previous findings,32 both the size of the household (measured as number of workers33) 
and the proportion of males, positively affect the propensity to migrate and the number of migrants, while 
the age negatively affects migration. 
Distance, as expected, has a negative influence on the migration decision, since it roughly identifies 
the cost of migration, but it is not significant at the 0.05 confidence level. Border has a negative influence 
on the migration decision. Communities belonging to Baja California Norte, Nuevo Leon and Chihuahua 
have historically lower levels of emigration to the U.S., migration being less necessary because of the 
greater number of U.S. firms across the border. Nonetheless, an F-test of the simultaneous significance of 
Distance and Borders strongly rejects the null hypothesis. 
Contingent factors all affect both the migration decision and the number of migrants, and all 
present the expected sign. Lastly, the significantly positive value of the IMR is in line with expectations: 
households with higher values of the variables facilitating migration are those that would like to send more 
members abroad. 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 There is a significant, but very small, negative effect of squared education. 
32
 See Massey et al. (1994), Winter et al. (2001), Fussel and Massey (2004) and Konseiga (2006). 
33
 The same effect is also found when the size of the household is expressed as the number of members. 
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F-Test Joint F-Test
Human Capital N° of Workers 0,186 *** 0,000 0,245 *** 0,000
0,013 0,030
Age -0,033 *** -0,013
0,007 0,007
Age Squared 0,000 0,000
0,000 0,000
Sexratio 0,363 *** 0,351 ***
0,082 0,097
Educ. 0,042 0,056
0,030 0,031
Educ. Squared -0,002 0,001
0,001 0,001
Educ*Wealth -0,011 -0,015 *
0,007 0,006
Fisical Capital Wealth 1,112 *** 0,000 0,461 * 0,000
0,180 0,211
Wealth Squared -0,101 *** -0,031
0,019 0,020
Household Network Hist. Migration 0,103 *** 0,000 0,049 *** 0,000
0,007 0,012
Current Net 0,005 *** 0,005 ***
0,001 0,002
US Res . 0,081 *** 0,033 *
0,010 0,016
Community Network Migration Prev. 1,986 *** 0,000 0,331 0,000
0,521 0,816
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -0,278 * 0,033
0,112 0,155
Contingent Factors Unem. Di ff. -3,853 * 0,000 -5,262 * 0,000
1,765 2,532
Exchage Rate -0,022 ** -0,034 ***
0,007 0,009
Avg. Law index -0,045 * -0,093 ***
0,019 0,023
Selection Distance 0,000 0,000
0,000
Border -0,393 ***
0,078
Constant -3,082 -1,247
0,462 0,772
Inverse Mi l l s  ratio 0,510 **
0,172
Censored obs 10781
Uncensored obs 2024
Selection
Rob. SE
Numb.
Rob. SE
Table 4: HTSP
 
Table 4. Source: author computation from MMP118. 
Robust standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping method; F-test shows that all the coefficient of the subgroup are 0 
simultaneously 
 
3.2 Ruling Out Endogeneity: IV Approach 
Solving the problem of sample selection does not guarantee that estimates are consistent. In the 
present analysis three sets of instruments were used, listed in Table 4. Following Woodruff and Zentero 
(2007) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), the first instrument is the average migration rate by state over 
the period 1956-59, at the peak of the Bracero Program (1942-1964).34 The second instrument is the 1924 
                                                          
34
 Thanks to Professor McKenzie for providing me original data from Gonzàlez Navarro (1974). 
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migration rate by state. The two sets of instruments are explained in detail in McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2007). The third set combines the first two and adds information on visa accessibility and average U.S. 
wages in the three years prior to the survey. 
1924 State Mig. Rate 0.097 0.065
1924 St. Mig. Rate*Wealth 0.494 0.353
1956-59 St. Mig. Rate 0.036 0.037
1956-59 St. Mig. Rate*Wealth 0.179 0.179
VISA accessability 0.064 0.042
Log US wage last 3. 2.409 0.192
Migration Prevalence 1.000
Mig. Prev.*Wealth 0.951 1.000
1924 State Mig. Rate 0.322 0.350 1.000
1924 St. Mig. Rate*Wealth 0.270 0.372 0.950 1.000
1956-59 St. Mig. Rate 0.272 0.251 0.535 0.450 1.000
1956-59 St. Mig. Rate*Wealth 0.266 0.308 0.555 0.544 0.954 1.000
VISA accessability 0.098 0.106 0.269 0.238 0.321 0.315 1.000
Log US wage last 3. -0.251 -0.221 -0.215 -0.166 -0.226 -0.219 -0.123 1.000
LUSWM24 M24W M50 M50W VISA
Table 5: Instrument Sets
Instrumental Variables Mean S.D.
Correlation MP MPW
 
Table 5: IV Set 
Correlations between instruments and instrumented variables are low, but not too low to flag a 
problem of weak instruments. As reported in Appendix under an IV Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
procedure, instruments appear to be exogenous, necessary and not weak. TLS is computed both for 
migration probability and number of migrants. Since the dependent variable is binary or discrete, robust 
standard errors were used. 2SLS estimations are not discussed here, since estimates are not unlike IV-
Probit ones. Nonetheless, although 2SLS requires less structural hypothesis than IV-Probit, the binary 
nature of the dependent variable may lead to inconsistent estimates. IV-Probit estimates are reported in 
Table 5, estimation was undertaken with Newey’s Two-Step35 Estimator (Newey and West, 1987), since the 
maximum likelihood estimation could not be computed. As shown in Newey and West (1987), the two-step 
method estimates consistent values for parameters, but is less efficient in estimating SE in comparison with 
MLE. It is possible that, if the instruments are weak or too strong (in conjunction with large sample size), 
the standard errors may be inconsistent. The over-identification test and post-estimation analyses are 
made with STATA10 overid plugin. 
A Wald test of exogeneity confirms the endogeneity problem and the need for an IV approach at 
0.05 confidence interval when using set A, and at 0.01 confidence interval when using set B; it is refused at 
0.05 confidence level with set C. The over-identification test (Amemiya-Lee-Newey test minimum chi 
squared statistic) fails to reject the over-identification restriction, corroborating the validity of the 
                                                          
35
 The name “Two-Step” oversimplifies the approach. 
 
19 
 
instruments used. Correlation matrix, 2SLS and IV-Probit suggest that the instruments are not weak but 
also not too strong, corroborating the idea that IV-Probit is the correct approach to use. 
All the coefficients analyzed have the expected sign and are robust to changes in the instrument 
set. Wealth and migration probability have an inverted U-shaped relation, and all network variables 
positively affect migration. Only current network appears to be non-significantly different from 0 with set A 
and set B. The instrumented variable, migration prevalence and its cross-effect36 with wealth, positively 
affects poorer households’ decision to migrate. This is in line with the idea that networks affect more social 
strata with lower access to information and economic opportunities. 
Lastly, the control variables, unemployment difference, exchange rate and the law tightness, are all 
non-significant or slightly-significant. When a test of joint significance is performed, they are significant 
(chi1 (3)= 13.64 – p=0.0034). The exchange rate is the only variable which was never significant in all three 
estimations.37  
 
                                                          
36
 However we are aware of the fact that estimation for cross variables could be non-informative in binary 
instrumental analysis.   
37
 A partial explanation for these results can be found in the small amount of information available at the time. 
Although twenty years is quite a long period, it is not likely to be informative since we have the same information the 
all the database in each year. Thus, a priori, it is possible that the variables analyzed are only giving evidence of yearly 
effects. Nonetheless, the results are plausible and robust to changes in instruments, and to the exclusion of one or 
both of the other variables. 
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N° of Workers 0.188 *** 0.187 *** 0.186 ***
0.012 0.012 0.012  
Age -0.028 *** -0.031 *** -0.033 ***
0.007 0.007 0.007  
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Sexratio 0.348 *** 0.352 *** 0.360 ***
0.079 0.078 0.076  
Educ. 0.103 ** 0.094 * 0.070 *
0.037 0.036 0.031  
Educ. Squared -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002  
0.001 0.001 0.001  
Educ*Wealth -0.019 ** -0.019 ** -0.017 **
0.007 0.007 0.006  
Wealth 0.982 *** 1.108 *** 1.185 ***
0.197 0.217 0.159  
Wealth Squared -0.056 * -0.069 ** -0.087 ***
0.025 0.026 0.018  
His t. Migration 0.087 *** 0.097 *** 0.104 ***
0.010 0.012 0.006  
Current Net 0.001 0.003 0.005 ***
0.002 0.003 0.001  
US Res . 0.076 *** 0.079 *** 0.081 ***
0.013 0.013 0.012  
Migration Prev. 11.446 ** 9.938 ** 6.433 **
3.610 3.440 2.045  
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -1.466 ** -1.509 *** -1.118 **
0.514 0.423 0.372  
Unem. Di ff. -0.876 -3.672 -5.221 *
3.288 3.801 2.309  
Exchage Rate 0.018 -0.004 -0.022  
0.023 0.028 0.012  
Avg. Law index -0.126 ** -0.091 -0.059 *
0.042 0.047 0.025  
Dis tance 0.001 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.001 0.000  
Border 0.209 -0.097 -0.365 *
0.329 0.395 0.151  
Constant -6.553 -5.420 -4.030  
1.510 1.666 0.747  
Wald test of exogeneity:
Prob > chi2 =
Amemiya-Lee-Newey min. chi-sq statistic
P-value =
Table 6: IV-Probit
7.902
0.0952
0.05820.022 0.0089
Set A Set B Set C
 
Table 6 IV Probit.*,**,***, stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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3.3 Tackling Simultaneously Self-Selection and Endogeneity: Three-Stage Estimation  
Following Mroz (1987) and Piacentini (2008), a model able to tackle sample selection and 
endogeneity simultaneously has this reduced form: 
    
              (  ) 
                         (  ) 
   ( 
         )  (  ) 
where equation (11) is level of migration, equation (12) identifies the instrument set, and equation (13) is 
selection. Errors are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated among the three. The system can be estimated 
through a TSLS, if at least two valid instruments are available. 
Implementation consists of deriving the IMR from the first step of the Heckman correction method, 
and then using it as a regressor in the TSLS. Since migration prevalence is likely to be endogenous both in 
migration decision and in level of migration the three-step procedure is implemented as follow. The first 
step consists of estimating the probability of migration with an IV-Probit procedure. The second step 
consists of computing the IMR from the first step. The third step consists of using the IMR in the IV 
regression for level of migration. 
 Table 6 reports results for the level of migration equation, using all three sets of instruments. 
Distance and border are used as identification variables, and are therefore not included in the level of 
migration equation. This procedure was developed to study situations with one endogenous variable, and it 
needs at least two valid instruments. Thus, we rely on Set C for the discussion, since Set C has at least two 
valid instruments for each endogenous variable. However set A and set B tell us that even two instruments 
and two endogenous variables can produce consistent estimations. 
 As expected, and already observed, with a conventional HTS procedure, only a few variables have a 
significant influence on the optimal level of migration. In particular, human capital and household-level 
network variables all affect the number of migrants, as well as the probability of migration. 
In the opposite direction, unemployment differences and exchange rate significantly affect the 
number of migrants, but not the migration decision. This is in line with picture (1b) and (1c). Households 
constrained in their optimal strategy by their budget are less likely to be affected by non-dramatic changes 
in the economic situation, since they cannot modify their migration strategy. In fact, they are likely to be 
non-migrants, or only one member migrates. Instead, richer households, able to send more members, are 
those more affected by changes in the economic situation. 
The non-significance of community networks in the optimal number of migrant analysis confirms 
that community-level and household networks partially act as substitutes. Since they both affect the 
probability of migration, it is possible to argue that they have different functions, and/or that they convey 
different kinds of information.  
Focusing on set A and set B we also observe a slightly significant inverted U-shaped relation 
between number of migrants and wealth. Once the problem of endogeneity is solved, IMR appears to be 
non-significant under sets A and B, and has a small negative effect under set C. This suggests, an absence of 
selectivity or, in the case of set C, negative bias selectivity, so that households with more “migration-prone” 
characteristics are those less likely to send more members. 
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N° of Workers 0,268 ** 0,082 *** 0,065 ***
0,103 0,014 0,012  
Age -0,034 * -0,010 *** -0,008 ***
0,014 0,002 0,002  
Age Squared 0,000 *** 0,000 *** 0,000 ***
0,000 0,000 0,000  
Sexratio 0,440 * 0,073 * 0,039  
0,206 0,035 0,030  
Educ. 0,138 0,008 -0,007  
0,074 0,010 0,009  
Educ. Squared -0,002 0,000 0,000  
0,001 0,000 0,000  
Educ*Wealth -0,029 * -0,004 -0,001  
0,015 0,002 0,002  
Wealth 1,173 * 0,181 * 0,073  
0,566 0,077 0,063  
Wealth Squared -0,066 * -0,011 * -0,007  
0,031 0,006 0,005  
His t. Migration 0,114 *** 0,056 *** 0,050 ***
0,033 0,005 0,005  
Current Net 0,004 *** 0,003 *** 0,003 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001  
US Res . 0,097 * 0,022 ** 0,015 *
0,043 0,008 0,007
Migration Prev. 12,132 1,004 -0,523
6,529 0,816 0,667
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -1,653 -0,204 0,041
0,887 0,124 0,108
Unem. Di ff. -2,762 *** -2,421 *** -2,085 ***
0,824 0,628 0,609  
Exchage Rate 0,003 -0,014 *** -0,015 ***
0,009 0,002 0,002  
Avg. Law index -0,172 * -0,021 -0,007  
0,086 0,014 0,012  
Inverse Mi l l s ' Ration 1,208 -0,035 -0,150 *
0,692 0,089 0,071  
_cons -6,532 -0,140 0,528  
3,614 0,463 0,371  
Number of Obs . 12800 12800 12800  
R2 0,123 0,228 0,230
Migration Prev.  
R-sq 0,848 0,857 0,8617
Adj R-sq 0,848 0,8567 0,8614
Shea's  Partia l  R-sq 0,003 0,104 0,1738
Shea's  Adj. P. R-sq 0,002 0,0977 0,1725
Robust F(2,12785) 152,830 *** 739,672 *** 324,644 ***
Mig. Prev*Wealth
R-sq 0,759 0,7684 0,7731
Adj R-sq 0,759 0,7681 0,7727
Shea's  Partia l  R-sq 0,004 0,0977 0,1508
Shea's  Adj. P. R-sq 0,002 0,0965 0,1494
Robust F(2,12785) 183,048 *** 535,676 *** 211,048 ***
Overid. Test 8,261 0,08
Table 7: 2SLS Pr. Set A Set B Set C
 
Table 7 Second Stage of TSL IV.*,**,***, stand for significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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3.4 Alternative Econometric Specification: IV-Poisson 
Since the level of migration is a count variable, TSL-IV regression may be inappropriate. This is the 
rationale behind the decision to propose the IV-Poisson as alternative specification. This is not the place to 
discuss the theoretical background behind IV-Poisson, the focus is on empirical results. A detailed 
explanation of the theoretical background is provided in Cameron and Trivedi (1998). In any case an 
important observation is necessary: IV-Poisson, assuming that the probability of each subsequent event is 
the same, cannot account for the selection bias. 
This is in contrast with the underlying mechanism presumed at the beginning of this section. IV-
Poisson assumes that there is no structural difference in sending one migrant or two. In economic terms, if 
there is a fixed cost of migration, it must be paid for each member undertaking migration, and not only for 
the first migrant. This is not implausible, recalling that an household is defined as migrant if one or more 
members have been in the U.S. in the three years prior to the undertaking of the survey, and that first-time 
migrants and experienced migrants are analyzed together. Therefore migration costs are plausibly 
different. In particular, the first migration requires an investment in contacts and human capital, while 
subsequent migrations probably do not. 
Although with the limitation described, the count approach is technically more correct, as the 
dependent variable in question is a discrete number between 0 and 7. Table 7 reports results for Poisson, 
Negative Binomial and IV-Poisson regression.38 
The results do not contradict previous findings. Wealth affects migration with an inverted U-shaped 
relation, all household-level network variables positively affect the number of migrants. Education is non-
significant, and no selection in terms of education is observed.  
Migration prevalence and its cross-effect with wealth have the expected signs, but they are 
significant at the 0.05 confidence level only under set A. This reflects results already found in previous 
analyses. Migration has a certain fixed initial investment which affects the probability of migration (as 
found in IV-Probit analysis), but it does not affect the optimal number of migrants. We can presume that 
this initial investment cost is mitigated by community level networks. Since IV-Poisson estimates the 
number of migrants without a selection process, migration prevalence loses part of its significance. 
Networks of migrants are more important for poorer than for richer social strata, as highlighted by the 
negative coefficient of the cross-effect of community networks and wealth. 
Coefficients for economic and policy variables have the expected signs, but they are non-significant. 
                                                          
38
 IV-Poisson regression is made with ivpois command in STATA10. 
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N° of Workers 0.306 *** 0.326 *** 0.416 *** 0.375 *** 0.386 ***
0.015 0.016  0.040 0.035 0.031  
Age -0.032 *** -0.039 *** -0.022 -0.033 -0.042 **
0.009 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.016  
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  
Sexratio 0.639 *** 0.666 *** 0.752 ** 0.557 ** 0.558 **
0.115 0.114  0.251 0.186 0.185  
Educ. 0.089 * 0.081  0.301 * 0.104 0.122  
0.044 0.044  0.125 0.092 0.095  
Educ. Squared -0.004 * -0.003 * -0.003 -0.001 -0.002  
0.002 0.002  0.003 0.003 0.003  
Educ*Wealth -0.019 * -0.019 * -0.061 * -0.032 -0.033  
0.009 0.009  0.025 0.020 0.019  
Wealth 1.653 *** 1.781 *** 2.779 *** 2.329 *** 2.242 ***
0.229 0.230  0.507 0.420 0.435  
Wealth Squared -0.140 *** -0.155 *** -0.136 -0.184 *** -0.168 ***
0.025 0.025  0.072 0.039 0.039  
His t. Migration 0.066 *** 0.083 *** 0.150 *** 0.182 *** 0.169 ***
0.003 0.004  0.029 0.015 0.014  
Current Net 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.012 ** 0.014 *** 0.013 ***
0.001 0.001  0.004 0.003 0.003  
US Res . 0.084 *** 0.094 *** 0.121 *** 0.141 *** 0.137 ***
0.015 0.015  0.032 0.026 0.026  
Migration Prev. 2.277 ** 2.514 *** 32.743 * 4.590 8.199  
0.729 0.750 13.910 4.989 5.559  
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -0.309 * -0.329 * -5.611 * -1.322 -1.651  
0.147 0.151 2.341 0.804 0.926  
Unem. Di ff. -10.368 *** -9.162 ** -9.097 -17.859 -11.561  
2.940 2.895  7.735 11.044 6.219  
Exchage Rate -0.064 *** -0.058 *** -0.027 -0.095 -0.063 *
0.010 0.011  0.043 0.052 0.029  
Avg. Law index -0.131 *** -0.121 *** -0.078 -0.069 -0.078  
0.032 0.031  0.068 0.058 0.046  
_cons -4.547 -5.217  -13.734 -5.043 -6.533  
0.691 0.683  3.417 2.639 2.332
Log-Likelihood
Test of Exogeneity
Migration Prev.
Mig. Prev.*Wealth *** ***
***
***
Table 8: IV-Poisson Set A Set B Set C
*** ***
Poisson Neg. Binomial
-6203.355 -6112.007
 
Table 8. IV-Poisson .*,**,***, stand for significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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4 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to reassess the analysis on the determinant of migration by 
focusing not only on the probability of migration, rather on the optimal investment in migration. To do so 
an empirical approach new to international migration literature was applied to evidence the relation 
between migration choices, wealth, costs and migrant networks. 
In line with previous findings, Mexican migrants belong to the middle of the income distribution in 
Mexico. Migration and wealth are non-linearly related. Household and community networks increase the 
migration propensity. Specifically, when large enough, networks further increase the migration propensity 
of the households belonging to the middle-left of the income distribution.  
Community and household-level networks are partially substitutes and partially complements. In 
particular, while household-level networks always positively affect migration (in both terms of propensity 
and numbers), community-level networks convey information which makes migration a feasible strategy. 
The Three-Stage Procedure and the IV-Poisson can simultaneously solve several empirical problems 
typical of migration studies: sample selection, endogeneity of migration networks, and the presence of 
count dependent variables. These approaches confirm previous findings, ensuring that they are not the 
result of endogeneity or sample-selection. Nonetheless, both methods, and more in general empirical 
migration studies, need to be improved.  
Particular promising seems to be the analysis of the legislation. The effect of U.S. legislation on 
Mexican migration should be investigated in more detail, focusing not on the aggregate level of analysis, 
but on checking whether changes in legislation have generated changes in the composition of migration 
flows. Since MMP contains information on the first and last destinations of household heads in the U.S. and 
Canada, local changes in legislation could be collected and analyzed to see if they affect the destinations of 
migrants. 
 
References 
 
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003, July). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters, 80(1), 
123-129. 
Borjas, G. J. (1985, Oct.). Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Earnings of Immigrants. Journal 
of Labor Economics, 77(4), 463-89. 
Borjas, G. J. (1987, Sep.). Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. The American Economic Review, 
77(4), 531-553. 
Borjas, G. J. (1990, Mar.). Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants: Reply. The American Economic 
Review, 80(1), 305-308. 
 
26 
 
Borjas, G. J. (1991, May). Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market: 1940-80. The American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association, 81(2), 287-291. 
Borjas, G. J. (1994, Dec.). The Economics of Migration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32(4), 1667-1717. 
Borjas, G. J. (1995, Apr.). Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What Happened to 
Immigrant Earnings in the 1980s? Journal of Labor Economics, 13(2), 201-245. 
Borjas, G. J. (1995, Spring). The Economic Benefits from Immigration. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
9(2). 
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (1998). Regression Analysis of Count Data (Vol. Econometric Society 
Monograph No.30). Cambridge University Press. 
Chiswick, B. R. (1999, May). Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected? The American Economic Review, 89(2), 
181-185. 
Chiswick, B. R., & Miller, P. W. (2002). Immigrant earnings: Language skills, linguistic concentrations and the 
business cycle. Journal of Population Economics, 15, 31-57. 
Chiswick, B. R., & Miller, P. W. (2006). Computer usage, destination language proficiency and theearnings of 
natives and immigrants. KMI Working Paper Series. 
Clemens, M. A., Montenegro, C. E., & Pritchett, L. (2008, July). The Place Premium: Wage Differences for 
Identical Workers across the US Border. Background Paper to the 2009 World Development 
Report(4671). 
Cornelius, W. (2005). Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 4(31), 775-794. 
de Haan, A. (2006, Feb.). Migration in the Development Studies Literature. UNU-WIDER Research 
Paper(2006/19). 
Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2003). Remittances and Inequality: A Dynamic Migration Model. IZA 
Discussion Papers(808). 
Durand, J., Massey, D. S., & Zenteno, R. M. (2001). Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuities 
and Changes. Latin American Research Review, 36(1), 107-127. 
Fawcett, J. T. (1989). Networks, Linkages, and Migration Systems. International Migration Review, 23(3), 
671-680. 
Filmer, D., & Pritchett, L. H. (2001, Feb.). Estimating Wealth Effect without Expenditure Data-or Tears: An 
Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India. Demography, 38(1), 115-132. 
Fussell, E., & Massey, D. S. (2004, Feb.). The Limits to Cumulative Causation: International Migration from 
Mexican Urban Areas. Demography, 41(1), 151-171. 
 
27 
 
Ghatak, S., Levine, P., & Wheatley Price, S. (1996). Migration Theories and Evidnce: an Assessment. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 10(2), 159-198. 
Goyal, S. (2007). Connections An introduction to Economics of Networks. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
Hanson, G. H. (2006, December). Illegal Migration from Mexico to United States. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 94, 869-924. 
Hanson, G. H., & Spilimebrgo, A. (1999, Dec.). Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wage: 
Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border. The American Economic Review, 89(5), 
1337-1357. 
Harris, J. R., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two sector analysis. 
America Economic Review, 60, 126-142. 
Hatton, T. J., & Williamson, J. G. (1992, September). International Migration and World Development: a 
Historical Perspective. NBER Historical Paper(41), 1-79. 
Hatton, T. J., & Williamson, J. G. (2003, March). What Fundamentals Drive World Migration? World Institute 
for Development Economics Research Discussion Paper(2003/23). 
Konseiga, A. (2006). Household Migartion Decisions as Survival Strategy: The Case of Burkina Faso. Journal 
of African Economies , 16(2), 198-233. 
Massey, D. S., & Espinosa, K. E. (1997, January). What's driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, 
Empirical, and Policy Analysis . The American Journal of Sociology, 102(4), 939-999. 
Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993, September). Theories 
of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and Development Review, 19(3), 
433-466. 
Massey, D. S., Goldring, L., & Durand, J. (1994, May). Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of 
Nineteen Mexican Communities. The American Journal of Sociology, 99(6), 1492-1533 . 
McKenzie, D. (2005). Measuring inequality with asset indicators. Journal of Population Economics, 18, 229-
260. 
McKenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2007). Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory 
and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 84, 1-24. 
Mexican Migration Project. (s.d.). http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/.  
Mroz, T. A. (1987, Jul.). The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women's Hours of Work to 
Economic and Statistical Assumptions. Econometrica, 55(4), 765-799. 
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987, May). ”A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent. Econometrica, 55(3), 703-708. 
 
28 
 
Orrenius, P. M. (1999, December). The role of family networks, coyote prices and the rural economy in 
migration from Western Mexico: 1965-1994. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Paper, 9910, 
1-44. 
Orrenius, P. M. (2001). Illegal immigration and enforcement along the southwest border. Border 
Economy(8). 
Ortega, F., & Peri, G. (2009). The Causes and Effects of International Labor Mobility: Evidence from OECD 
Countries 1980-2005. NBER Working Paper Version(14833). 
Peri, G. Giovanni Peri website. http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/ 
Piacentini, M. (2008). Migration Enclaves, Schooling Choices and Social Mobility. Centro Studi Luca 
d’Agliano Development Working Papers. 
Radu, D. (2008, May 531-548). Social Interactions in Economic Models of Migration: A Review and 
Appraisal. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 34(4). 
Roy, A. D. (1951, Jun.). Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 
3(2), 135-146. 
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962, Oct.). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. The Journal of Political Economy, 
70(5), 80-93. 
Stark, O. (1984). Migration decision making: A review article. Journal of Development Economics, 14, 251-
259. 
Stark, O. (1991). The migration of Labor. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 
Stark, O., & Levhari, D. (1982, Oct.). On Migration and Risk in LDCs. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 31(1), 191-196. 
Taylor, J. E. (1986). Differential migration,networks, information and risk. In O. Stark, Research in Human 
Capital and Development (Vol. 4, p. 147-171). Greenwich, Connetticut, US: JAI Press. 
Todaro, M. (1969). A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries. The 
American Economic Review, 59, 138-148. 
Winters, P., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2001, Winter). Family and Community Networks in Mexico-U.S. 
Migration. The Journal of Human Resources, 36(1), 159-184. 
Woodruff, C., & Zentero, R. (2007). Migration networks and microenterprises in Mexico. Journal of 
Development Economics, 82, 509-528. 
Yang, D. (2008, April). International Migration, Remittances and Household Investment: Evidence from 
Philippine Migrants' Exchange Rate Shocks. The Economic Journal(118), 591-630. 
 
 
 
29 
 
Appendix  OLS 
Probability of
Migration
N° of Workers 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 ***
0.002 0.003 0.004  
Age -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001  
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Sexration 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 ***
0.014 0.013 0.015  
Educ. 0.002 0.002 0.002  
0.005 0.004 0.004  
Educ. Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Educ*Wealth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
0.001 0.001 0.001  
Wealth 0.156 *** 0.156 *** 0.156 ***
0.022 0.018 0.025  
Wealth Squared -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
0.003 0.002 0.003  
His t. Migration 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 ***
0.001 0.002 0.004  
Current Net 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 **
0.000 0.000 0.000  
US Res . 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 ***
0.003 0.003 0.004  
Migration Prev. 0.367 *** 0.367 *** 0.367  
0.107 0.104 0.248  
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -0.049 * -0.049 * -0.049  
0.021 0.021 0.039  
Unem. Di ff. -0.856 * -0.856 * -0.856  
0.357 0.357 0.813  
Exchage Rate -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005  
0.001 0.001 0.003  
Avg. Law index -0.008 -0.008 -0.008  
0.004 0.005 0.012  
Dis tance 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Border -0.061 *** -0.061 *** -0.061  
0.015 0.013 0.036  
Constant -0.021 -0.021 -0.021  
0.071 0.060 0.125  
N° of observations 12805 12805  12805
R2 0.1933 0.1933  0.1933
OLS OLS OLS
Rob. SE Cluster Rob. SE
 
Table 9: OLS.*,**,***, stand for significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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Number of 
Migrants
N° of Workers 0.087 *** 0.087 *** 0.087 ***
0.004 0.006 0.013  
Age -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002  
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 **
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Sexration 0.084 *** 0.084 *** 0.084 **
0.022 0.021 0.025  
Educ. 0.005 0.005 0.005  
0.008 0.006 0.006  
Educ. Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Educ*Wealth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  
0.002 0.001 0.001  
Wealth 0.177 *** 0.177 *** 0.177 ***
0.034 0.027 0.039  
Wealth Squared -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 ***
0.004 0.003 0.004  
His t. Migration 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 ***
0.001 0.004 0.004  
Current Net 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 **
0.000 0.001 0.001  
US Res . 0.024 *** 0.024 *** 0.024 **
0.004 0.006 0.009  
Migration Prev. 0.212 0.212 0.212  
0.169 0.160 0.309  
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -0.005 -0.005 -0.005  
0.034 0.034 0.059  
Unem. Di ff. -1.978 *** -1.978 *** -1.978
0.564 0.576 1.325  
Exchage Rate -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *
0.002 0.002 0.004  
Avg. Law index -0.023 *** -0.023 ** -0.023  
0.007 0.008 0.018  
Dis tance 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Border -0.062 ** -0.062 ** -0.062  
0.024 0.019 0.051  
Constant -0.125 -0.125 -0.125  
0.111 0.089 0.187  
N° of observations 12805 12805  12805
R2 0.2325 0.2325  0.2325
OLS OLS OLS
Rob. SE Cluster Rob. SE
 
Table 10: OLS (Number of Migrants) *,**,***, stand for significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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HTSP
N° of Workers 0.186 *** 0.186 *** 0.186 *** 0.245 *** 0.245 *** 0.245 ***
0.012 0.013 0.013 0.020 0.030 0.034
Age -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sexratio 0.363 *** 0.363 *** 0.363 *** 0.351 *** 0.351 *** 0.351 **
0.076 0.082 0.084 0.092 0.097 0.117
Educ. 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.056 0.056 0.056
0.028 0.030 0.031 0.036 0.031 0.033
Educ. Squared -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002 * 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Educ*Wealth -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 * -0.015 * -0.015 *
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
Wealth 1.112 *** 1.112 *** 1.112 *** 0.461 * 0.461 * 0.461 **
0.144 0.180 0.174 0.209 0.211 0.177
Wealth Squared -0.101 *** -0.101 *** -0.101 *** -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
0.016 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.018
Hist. Migration 0.103 *** 0.103 *** 0.103 *** 0.049 *** 0.049 *** 0.049 ***
0.004 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.012 0.007
Current Net 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
US Res . 0.081 *** 0.081 *** 0.081 *** 0.033 * 0.033 * 0.033 *
0.012 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.014
Migration Prev. 1.986 *** 1.986 *** 1.986 0.331 0.331 0.331
0.568 0.521 1.445 0.790 0.816 0.872
Mig. Prev.*Wealth -0.278 * -0.278 * -0.278 0.033 0.033 0.033
0.114 0.112 0.228 0.150 0.155 0.164
Unem. Di ff. -3.853 * -3.853 * -3.853 -5.262 * -5.262 * -5.262
1.834 1.765 4.026 2.116 2.532 3.617
Exchage Rate -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.034 **
0.007 0.007 0.015 0.009 0.009 0.012
Avg. Law index -0.045 * -0.045 * -0.045 -0.093 *** -0.093 *** -0.093 **
0.020 0.019 0.048 0.021 0.023 0.030
Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
Border -0.393 *** -0.393 *** -0.393 ***
0.086 0.078 0.239
Constant -3.082 -3.082 -3.082 -1.247 -1.247 -1.247
0.437 0.462 0.837 0.670 0.772 0.656
Inverse Mi l l s  ratio 0.510 *** 0.510 ** 0.510 ***
0.127 0.172 0.148
Censored obs 10781 10781 10781
Uncensored obs 2024 2024 2024
Cl. Rob. SE
Selection Selection Selection Numb. Numb. Numb.
Rob. SE Cluster Rob. SE Rob. SE
 
Table 4 HTSp. *,**,***, stand for significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. Robust standard errors using bootstrapping 
method 
 
